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IMPROVING LITIGATION AGAINST DRUG
MANUFACTURERS FOR FAILURE TO
WARN AGAINST POSSIBLE SIDE
EFFECTS: KEEPING DUBIOUS LAWSUITS
FROM DRIVING GOOD DRUGS OFF THE
MARKET
Howard A. Denemark *
Beneficial drugs, approved by the United States Food and
Drug Administration, have been forced off the market by the
current legal standards for imposing a duty on drug manufac-
turers to warn of adverse side effects from their drugs. Expert
evidence that would not withstand scrutiny from scientific and
medical peers is being used to hold drug manufacturers liable
for failure to warn of potential side effects. This Article
presents an approach to establishing a legal duty to warn that
offers a superior resolution of the tension between concern for
the existence or entry of unsafe drugs in the marketplace and
concern for the loss of safe and beneficial drugs therefrom.
IN THE EARLY 1980's, a woman who complained to her doctor
about morning sickness would very likely have received a pre-
scription for the drug Bendectin. 1 Bendectin was approved for this
use by the United States Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
* Attorney, Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, New York, N.Y. B.S., Washington
University in St. Louis (1981); J.D., University of Wisconsin School of Law (1984). I wish
to acknowledge my many discussions with Mr. David A. Rier, a doctoral candidate in
Medical Sociology at Columbia University.
1. Bendectin was a frequently prescribed drug for morning sickness from the 1950s
through the early 1980s. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823,
824 (1988), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 218 (1989) (thirty million women used Bendectin be-
tween 1957 and 1983); Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories, 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st
Cir. 1987) (Bendectin was used in one million new therapy starts in 1979, declining to
none in 1984). The drug was sold abroad under the names "Debendox" and "Lenotan."
Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F.Supp. 799, 800 (D.D.C. 1986), afd, 857
F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 218 (1989).
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and remains an approved drug in our national pharmacopoeia.'
Today, a woman who complains to her doctor about morning sick-
ness will not receive a prescription for Bendectin because no man-
ufacturer makes the drug. Despite overwhelming scientific evi-
dence that Bendectin is safe for both the mother and the unborn
child, more than a thousand parents of babies with birth defects
have sued Bendectin's manufacturer, making sale of the drug un-
profitable.3 In this way, the American public has been deprived of
a safe, beneficial, FDA-approved drug.
Paradoxically, therapeutic drugs are one of the most highly
regulated products sold to the American public.4 Before any pre-
scription or over-the-counter drug is allowed to reach the con-
sumer, the FDA must first approve it as safe and effective. The
FDA approves drugs for use after first reviewing the results of
chemical and animal studies, and secondly, clinical studies on a
limited number of patients.6 Although pre-market testing may
prove the efficacy of a drug, such testing cannot prove with cer-
tainty that a drug is safe.' Nonetheless, after perhaps a decade of
testing a new drug,8 the FDA considers whether the overall health
of the American public would be improved or harmed by its ad-
mission into the national pharmacopoeia.9
After the experts of the FDA allow the use of a drug based
upon an analysis of the total scientific knowledge they have
amassed, users who believe they sustained injuries from a drug's
side effects may sue the manufacturer for damages, alleging that
the manufacturer did not issue adequate warnings about a possi-
2. Richardson, 857 F.2d at 824 (the FDA first approved Bendectin in 1956 and the
approval has never been rescinded).
3. See Ross, Drug Did Not Cause Birth Defects, Court Says, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1,
1988, at A19, col. 1.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, 651 F.2d 532,
537 (8th Cir. 1981) (drug industry characterized as a "pervasively regulated business").
5. No new drug may be approved for use absent "full reports of investigations which
have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is
effective in use." Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (1988)
6. Drug Industry Antitrust Act: Hearings on H.R. 6245 Before the Antitrust Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1962) [hereinafter
Hearings] (Statement of George P. Larrick, Commissioner, FDA).
7. Ackerman, Watching for Problems that Testing May Have Missed, F.D.A. News
and Warnings, Oct. 17, 1988, at 13.
8. Id.
9. Walsh & Klein, The Conflicting Objectives of Federal and State Tort Law Drug
Regulation, 41 FoOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 171, 180 (1986).
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ble side effect. 10 Drug product liability lawsuits have resulted in
large verdicts, particularly when, as with Bendectin, the plaintiff
is a child who claims that a drug his mother used during preg-
nancy caused congenital birth defects."
High damage awards exert a regulatory effect on drug manu-
facturers.1 2 Potential liability can drive drug companies to with-
draw products from the market, and discourage research into new
drugs used by individuals likely to sue and receive large damage
awards.' Thus, the FDA's decision that a drug is safe, effective,
and more beneficial than harmful can be nullified by the regula-
tory effect of private tort actions.
Some commentators have suggested that an FDA determina-
tion allowing the sale of a drug should preempt private suits."
Most courts, however, deem the FDA's determination simply to be
part of the evidence that a trier of fact may consider in reaching a
judgment on liability.' 5 This article will explore the basic contours
of FDA and common-law drug regulation. It will suggest a judi-
cial approach to drug lawsuits that may help prevent private liti-
gants from chasing FDA-approved products off the market, while
preserving the right to sue when companies act contrary to the
public good.
I. FDA REGULATION OF DRUGS
Prior to January 1, 1907, when the Pure Food and Drug Act
10. See generally Annotation, Liability of Manufacturer or Seller for Injury or
Death Allegedly Caused by Failure to Warn Regarding Danger in Use of Vaccine or Pre-
scription Drug, 94 A.L.R. 3d 748 (1979) (summarizing and classifying cases where failure
to warn alleged).
11. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 82-100 and accompanying text.
13. Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management
in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 288-90 (1985); Ackerman, supra note 7, at 16; see
infra notes 82-100 and accompanying text.
14. Walsh & Klein, supra note 9, at 193; see also Huber, supra note 13, at 334-35
(arguing that the courts should respect the determinations of expert licensing agencies);
Comment, Federal Preemption of Prescription Drug Labelling: Antidote for Pharmaceuti-
cal Industry Overdosing on State court Jury Decisions in Products Liability Cases, 22 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 629 (1989) [hereinafter Comment, Prescription Drug Labeling] (argu-
ing that the supremacy clause and the relative expertise of agencies as compared to jurors
dictates that FDA determinations should preempt state court suits).
15. See, e.g., Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories Div. of American Cyanamid Co., 863
F.2d 1173, 1176-78 (5th Cir. 1988) (FDA approval does not preempt civil suits but is
admissible as evidence); id. at 1176 n.2 (listing other cases).
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became law,'" medicines sold in America were regulated by the
common law. While Upton Sinclair's book, The Jungle, 7 was con-
vincing legislators and the American public that the meat packing
industry was selling unhealthy products, a young journalist named
Samuel Hopkins Adams was publishing fiery articles in popular
magazines about the dirty business of patent medicines.' 8 Adams'
writings record an era when "doctors" of dubious credentials pro-
moted secret formula potions guaranteed to cure cancer, paralysis,
opiate addiction, or, sometimes, every human affliction from colds
to impotence.' 9 Particularly common were supposed cures for tu-
berculosis,2" a debilitating, highly communicable lung disease
which causes its victims to waste away and die.2 In fact, the sup-
posed cures were powerless, and no effective drug treatment for
tuberculosis existed before 1944, when streptomycin was
introduced. 2
The common law, and indeed, the common sense of the
American public, did little to inhibit the commercial success of
the ineffective, but lavishly promoted, medicines. Quacks not only
sold medicines that were worthless as therapeutic agents and
falsely advertised them, but they also sold some that were actually
harmful to the unfortunate customers who took them. In part
because of the success in focusing public attention on the danger-
ous dishonesty in the patent medicine business, new laws were en-
acted to protect a credulous public from unscrupulous purveyors
of patent medicines.2 4
16. Law of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938).
17. U. SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906).
18. S. HOLBROOK. THE GOLDEN AGE OF QUACKERY 14-28 (1959).
19. Id.; see also United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) ("Since the turn
of the century, resourceful entrepreneurs have advertised a wide variety of ... cures for
cancer, including liniments of turpentine, mustard, oil, eggs, and ammonia .....
20. S. HOLBROOK, supra note 18, at 14-41.
21. STEAD & BATES, Tuberculosis, in HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE, at 700-03 (9th ed. 1980).
22. See STEAD & BATES, supra note 21, at 700.
23. For example, "Dr. King's New Discovery for Consumption," a mixture of chloro-
form and morphine sold without a label specifying its contents, could only damage the
tubercular patients to whom it was promoted since the chloroform would inhibit coughing,
blocking the body's natural attempt to clear the lungs, while the morphine would do no
good and could induce an addiction. See S. HOLBROOK, supra note 18 at 21-24.
Potions sold as cures for morphine addiction might themselves be little more than
morphine solutions, designed not to break the habit but to supply the unsuspecting cus-
tomer with his narcotic, thereby extending the damage done by the drug. Id. at 21-22.
24. See generally id. at 3-28 (discussing the events and societal outrage surrounding
patented nostrums, leading eventually to enactment of the Pure Food and Drug Act in
416 [Vol. 40:413
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Today, no medicine may be sold to the American public until
it is proved both safe and effective.25 The proponent must prove,
by "substantial evidence," the effectiveness of a drug to achieve
the ends stated in its proposed labeling.2 The FDA can reject
drug applications based on testing insufficiently rigorous to satisfy
its scientists that the proponent's claims of efficacy are proved.27
Unlike the substantial evidence standard for efficacy, the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not specify a standard by
which drug safety is to be proved. Safety cannot be demonstrated
in the same positive way as efficacy, since the use of a drug may
cause long-delayed or unexpected side effects that current scien-
tific knowledge cannot predict or detect.28 But side effects of some
sort are common and expected.29 The FDA decides whether to ap-
prove a drug after it evaluates drug safety by balancing known
risks against potential benefits, considering the seriousness of
known side effects, the nature of the disease or condition being
treated, and the availability of other treatment options.30
The burden of proving the worth of a drug to the FDA falls
on the applicant, 31 typically the company with commercial rights
to the drug. The company generally performs research to support
the application, commissions the work at outside laboratories, or.
tries to interest university researchers in conducting the needed
research. A great deal of money might be made if a new drug is
approved, but losses in the form of unrecouped research and de-
velopment expenses are likely if approval is withheld. The partisan
drug company presents a drug application with research support-
ing claims of efficacy and safety. Lawyers play a significant role in
the application process, though mostly by preparing the scientific
personnel to defend their applications rather than by direct
advocacy.2
1907).
25. Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (1988).
26. Id. § 355(d)(5) (1988).
27. See, e.g., Ubiotica v. FDA, 427 F.2d 376, 378 (6th Cir. 1970) (upholding the
FDA's right to reject plaintiff's drug application for failure to prove safety and efficacy).
28. For example, Diethylstilbestrol ("DES"), a drug used routinely in the 1950's and
1960's to prevent miscarriages, was discovered to have caused tumors in the daughters of
the women using the drug some 15 years after its use. Ackerman, supra note 7, at 13.
29. See infra text accompanying note 43.
30. See Grounds for Withdrawing Approval, Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH)
71,165 (May 28, 1985).
31. Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1988).
32. Lavelle, Lawyers for New Drugs Must Practice Patience, Nat'l L. J., Jun. 27,
1989-90]
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The FDA employs a professional staff of scientists who are
capable of evaluating the research that underlies an application.
The agency supplements its in-house expertise by empaneling ad-
visory committees of experts who help evaluate drug safety and
efficacy in their particular areas of expertise.3" The reliability of
United States drug-approval procedures is illustrated by the fact
that some countries approve drugs for use by their citizens based
on FDA approval alone. 4
Testing a drug before it is marketed is not a perfect tool.
Testing in animals will not always raise a suspicion of an adverse
effect in humans, particularly as to whether a drug is a teratogen,
that is, a drug that, when administered to a pregnant woman, can
cause a birth defect in a child born to her. 5 For example, the
powerful human teratogen Thalidomide, a sedative that can cause
birth defects if a pregnant woman takes even a single dose at the
wrong stage of pregnancy, was tested extensively and did not re-
veal its teratogenicity.3 6 Conversely, there is scientific support for
the generalization that any agent will be teratogenic at some dose
level in some species when introduced at the proper stage of fetal
development. 7 As to human pre-market testing, an article in a
recent FDA Bulletin acknowledged its inherent limits:
Even the most extensive pre-market testing can never cover all
possible circumstances. Testing perhaps 3,000 people over a pe-
riod of months or even a few years won't always identify a rare
reaction unfolding over a long time, or affecting perhaps just one
person in 10,000. Furthermore, drugs are rarely tested in such
potentially vulnerable groups as the elderly, and never among
pregnant women. Consequently, not every reaction can be fore-
seen for the entire population . ... 1
Given the limits of pre-market testing, it is not surprising
1988, at 20, col. 4.
33. Borer, t-PA and the Principles of Drug Approval, 317 NEw ENG. J. OF MED.
1659, 1659 (1987).
34. Ackerman, supranote 7, at 16.
35. See, e.g., THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1958
(2nd ed. 1987).
36. Sherman & Strauss, Thalidomide: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 41 FOOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 458, 459-61 (1986).
37. Schwetz, Monitoring Problems in Teratology, in SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS
IN MONITORING AND EVALUATING TOXICOLOGICAL RESEARCH 181-82 (E. Gralla ed.
1981). For a further discussion of the legal significance of this scientific phenomenon, see
infra text accompanying notes 150-93.
38. Ackerman, supra note 7, at 13.
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that the FDA monitors doctors' reports of drug side effects. The
FDA Drug Bulletin, a circular sent to licensed physicians in the
United States, includes a form for reporting suspected adverse
drug reactions to the FDA. Reporting is optional for doctors
but mandatory for drug manufacturers.3 9 The FDA receives
thousands of Adverse Drug Reaction Reports annually, and is act-
ing to encourage more health professionals to submit reports.4 If
adverse reaction reports or other developments raise a suspicion
that a drug is unsafe, the FDA has the power to withdraw that
drug from the market.4
In addition to rejecting any drug not shown sufficiently safe
and effective, the FDA also controls the contents of package in-
serts and warning labels, ruling on whether enough reliable evi-
dence exists to issue a warning about a suspected side effect. 2
II. DRUG SIDE-EFFECT LITIGATION
A. The Nature of Liability for Drug Side Effects
American jurisprudence has come to accept that drugs are
not magic potions that do only what they are intended and noth-
ing else. As one physician told a subcommittee of the House of
Representatives:
Practically every useful drug carries with its administration
the danger of one or more side effects. Essentially, the physician
realizes that every time he prescribes a drug he takes a calcu-
lated risk, hoping that the beneficial effects of the preparation
will outweigh any possible side effect. In this respect a drug has
been aptly compared to a two-edged sword.The physician always
hopes that the therapeutic edge will be sharp, while the side-
effect edge will be dull. Unfortunately, the reverse sometimes
takes place .... 11
Accordingly, the law recognizes that a drug, even when properly
39. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (1989).
40. See Ackerman, supra note 7, at 13-15.
41. Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1988).
42. The FDA's authority to control drug warnings is not absolute. Agency rules al-
low a drug manufacturer that is aware of some hazardous side effect to insert a warning
without FDA approval. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (1989). One commentator, however, has
suggested that the drug companies are not able to make use of this provision in light of
their ongoing dependence on the FDA's good will. Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products
Liability: The Role of the Food and Drug Administration, 41 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 233,
236 (1986).
43. Hearings, supra note 6, at 101 (1962) (Statement of M. Harold Book).
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designed, manufactured, and administered, may cause side ef-
fects.44 The Restatement (Second) of Torts holds that, although
one in the business of selling dangerous products should be liable
for harms the products cause to consumers despite the seller's ex-
ercise of "all possible care," such liability should not be imposed
on sellers of "unavoidably unsafe" products.45 "Unavoidably un-
safe" products include those "which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their in-
tended and ordinary use."46 Thus, the common law does not re-
quire that drug manufacturers perform the impossible task of
marketing only products having no side effects, but rather, the law
requires that drug manufacturers issue a warning of the risks par-
ticular to a given drug.47
In the case of over-the-counter drugs, the warnings must be
available directly to the purchaser of the product in the packaging
materials or on the container itself.49 For most prescription drugs,
the warning need only be given to the physician rather than the
patient.49 The ultimate consumer of prescription drugs cannot
lawfully buy the drug without a doctor's prescription. The con-
sumer goes to a doctor who may prescribe a drug as one aspect of
providing health care. Thus, in general, it is not the consumer's
desire that brings about a purchase, but the doctor's expert ad-
vice. Inherent in the doctor's choice of a drug is a balancing of
risks and benefits that doctors are trained to understand in a con-
text of the patient's individual health needs. Some courts have rec-
ognized that doctors stand between drug vendors and consumers,
controlling access to drugs, and have ruled that drug warnings is-
sued to doctors discharge the manufacturer's duty to warn about
harmful side effects. 50 However, some drugs, although dispensed
44. The Supreme Court of the United States recognized this fact in United States v.
Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979) ("Few if any drugs are completely safe in the sense
that they may be taken by all persons in all circumstances without risk.").
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A & comment k (1965).
46. Id. § 402A comment k (1965).
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, Etc., 165 N.J. Super. 311, 322,
398 A.2d 132, 137 (1979), certificate denied, 81 N.J. 50, 404 A.2d 1150 (1979).
49. Brushwood & Simonsmeier, Drug Information for Patients: Duties of the Manu-
facturer, Pharmacist, Physician, and Hospital, 7 J. OF LEGAL MED. 279, 286 (1986).
50. See, e.g., Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Company, 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65, 507 P.2d 653,
661, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 53 (1973) ("In the case of medical prescriptions, 'if adequate
warning of potential dangers of a drug has been given to doctors, there is no duty by the
drug manufacturer to insure that the warning reaches the doctor's patient . . .'). There is
an exception to this rule that reinstates the duty of drug manufacturers to insure that the
420 [Vol. 40:413
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by prescription, involve little individual consideration by the pre-
scribing doctor. For example, birth control pills are often dis-
pensed to women at their request as a means of contraception
rather than being prescribed as a therapeutic drug. 1 In such a
circumstance, some courts have extended the duty to warn to in-
clude directly informing the user of the drug. 2
The failure to issue an appropriate warning, whether to the
consumer or the community of physicians, is a necessary focus of
a product suit against a drug manufacturer. A manufacturer that
issues a warning to the appropriate party, adequately setting forth
the danger of side effects, enjoys protection from suits alleging
that the drug caused those side effects.5 Suit may be brought
under the rubric of negligence, breach of a duty to warn, breach
of warranty, or strict liability, alleging a failure to include a warn-
ing adequate to make the product safe, but a suit brought under"
any of these theories necessarily turns on precisely the same issue:
Whether the manufacturer issued an adequate warning about the
possible harmful side effects of a given drug. 4
A failure to warn becomes actionable only if the drug manu-
facturer knew or should have known of the side effect in question.
Griggs v. Combe, Inc.5 5 illustrates this point. In Griggs, the Su-
preme Court of Alabama answered a certified question posed by
patient receives the warning when the over-promotion of the drug effectively persuades the
prescribing doctor to ignore the warnings. Id. This exception is beyond the scope of this
Article.
51. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 137, 475 N.E.2d 65,
69 (1985) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
52. See, e.g., id. (manufacturer of oral contraceptive found liable for failing to di-
rectly warn user of potential side effects).
53. Felix v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 540 So. 2d 102, 105 (Fla. 1989) (manufacturer of
drug Acutane not liable for birth defects suffered by user's child since warning provided by
manufacturer was adequate to convey to physicians the dangers of the drug to pregnant
women); Serna v. Roche Laboratories, 101 N.M. 522, 524, 684 P.2d 1187, 1189 (1984)
(drug manufacturer not liable when user suffering side effects presents no evidence of inad-
quate manufacturer warnings); Eiser v. Feldman, 123 A.D.2d 583, 583-84, 507 N.Y.S.2d
386, 387-88 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (oral contraceptive manufacturer not liable for visual
impairment suffered by user since manufacturer provided express warnings to physicians
and patients in package insert).
54. E.g, Grigss v. Coombe, Inc., 456 So. 2d 790, 791-93 (Ala. 1984) (discussing
possible theories of recovery for injuries due to drug side effects); see Werner v. Upjohn
Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981) (stating "the
issue under either theory [neglignece or strict liability] is essentially the same: was the
warning adequate?"). But see Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099, 1106 (Colo. Ct. App.
1976) ("Although we agree the evidence which proves a failure to warn is the same under
both theories, we disagree that the theories are identical.").
55. 456 So. 2d 790 (Ala. 1984).
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, ask-
ing whether any theory available under Alabama law allowed re-
covery by a user of an over-the-counter topical analgesic for fail-
ure to warn, where the manufacturer neither knew nor should
have known that the active ingredient was capable of producing a
strong adverse reaction. 6 The active ingredient, benzocaine, had
been in use as a topical treatment since 1903 and the plaintiff's
serious adverse reaction to the drug was apparently the first re-
ported incident.5 7
The Supreme Court of Alabama held that no legal theory,
including "negligence, strict product liability, breach of implied
warranty of merchantability, or duty to warn" justified a recov-
ery."8 Benzocaine caused a condition in the plaintiff known as
"Stevens-Johnson Syndrome." '5 In severe cases, Stevens-Johnson
Syndrome can be fatal.60 The Court refused to declare the prod-
uct "defective" or "unreasonably dangerous," as is required for a
plaintiff's verdict under Alabama product liability doctrines, be-
cause the danger could not be known through human foresight.6
Similarly, since the manufacturer lacked foreknowledge that this
type of injury could result, it was not negligent to omit a warn-
ing.62 In deciding a similar suit based only upon the theory of neg-
ligent failure to warn, the Missouri Court of Appeals summed up
the law with great precision: "If [an adverse drug] reaction had
never occurred before, [the drug manufacturer] could not know
about it or in the exercise of the required degree of care, could not
have found out about it, and absent knowledge of such reaction,
there could be no duty to warn."' 3
Similarly, where the manufacturer knows of a possible side
effect and issues an adequate warning, an action against the man-
56. Id. at 791.
57. Id. at 791-92.
58. Id. at 791.
59. Id.
60. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1644 (27th ed. 1988).
61. Griggs, 456 So. 2d at 792.
62. Id.
63. Johnston v. Upjohn Co., 442 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (citation omit-
ted). In Johnston, the court held that plaintiff did not make a sufficient case against a drug
manufacturer for failure to warn because the manufacturer had neither knowledge nor the
means of knowing that the plaintiff might suffer a severe reaction to a particular antibiotic.
The plaintiff's reaction was the first reported instance of a serious side effect from use of
the drug. Id. at 95.
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ufacturer will not lie.6 4 Summary judgment dismissing claims
against a manufacturer should be granted where the court can
find, as a matter of law, that the manufacturer warned in clear
language about the risks of suffering the harm later claimed by
the plaintiff.65 Thus, issuing an adequate warning gives manufac-
turers a strong defense to side-effect litigation."6
B. The Role of Expert Testimony
The issue of whether a given drug caused the physical prob-
lem from which a plaintiff suffers is an element of proof in any
side-effect litigation. This element is not satisfied merely by show-
ing that an individual used a drug and later suffered ill health, 7
or in the case of a teratogen, gave birth to a damaged baby.
Courts have held that "[w]ithout more, [a] proximate temporal
relationship will not support a finding of causation."6 The "more"
is inevitably provided by medical or scientific expert witnesses who
testify that there is reasonable medical or scientific certainty that
64. See Chambers v. G. D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 381 (D. Md. 1975),
afl'd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating that District of Columbia law precludes manu-
facturer liability when adequate warnings are given); Felix v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 540
So. 2d 102, 105 (Fla. 1989) (denying liability because the prescribing physician was ade-
quately warned); Eiser v. Feldman, 123 A.D.2d 583, 583, 507 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986) (same).
65. E.g., Felix v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 513 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987), affld, 540 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1989) (summary judgment appropriate where doc-
tor aware of risks from drug to pregnant women based on information provided by manu-
facturer); Serna v. Roche Laboratories, 101 N.M. 522, 525, 684 P.2d 1187, 1190 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1984) (summary judgment appropriate where manufacturer warns doctors but
not patients of potential side-effects from prescription drugs).
66. One jurisdiction has particularized adequacy as follows:
I. the warning must adequately indicate the scope of the danger; 2. the warning
must reasonably communicate the extent or seriousness of the harm that could
result from misuse of the drug; 3. the physical aspects of the warning must be
adequate to alert a reasonably prudent person to the danger; 4. a simple direc-
tive warning may be inadequate when it fails to indicate the consequences that
might result from failure to follow it and . . .; 5. the means to convey the warn-
ing must be adequate.
Serna, 101 N.M. at 524, 684 P.2d at 1189 (citing Richards v. Upjohn Co., 95 N.M. 675,
679, 625 P.2d 1192, 1196 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980)). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Florida
has held that it can dismiss a suit as a matter of law if a "warning is accurate, clear, and
unambiguous." Felix, 540 So. 2d at 105.
67. Hasler v. United States, 718 F.2d 202, 204-06 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 817 (1984) (causal nexus between swine flu shot and plaintiff's rheumatoid arthritis
found lacking); Saxe v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 135, 144 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (holding
that the temporal relationship between a flu vaccination and a subsequent illness taken
alone, does not sufficiently establish causation), affid, 751 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1984).
68. Hasler, 718 F.2d at 205.
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the drug caused the damage. Naturally, the plaintiffs' will seek
out experts whose views support a finding that the drug caused the
damage, and the defendants will counter with experts who reach
the opposite conclusion.
Normally, expert testimony is accepted as admissible. For ex-
ample, the Federal Rules of Evidence favor the admission of ex-
pert testimony when proffered. The intent of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702 itself and the advisory committee note to the rule, is to
allow for the liberal admission of expert testimony. 9
There is a growing concern in both the legal and scientific
communities, however, that the selection of experts for trial may
not be a benign process of finding a legitimate doctor or scientist
whose opinions most closely parallel the desired proof.70 Rather,
the supposed experts may be individuals whose views are well
outside the mainstream of their disciplines, or worse, "experts"
who tailor their testimony with little concern for accuracy, for the
benefit of the parties that retain them.7'
Dr. Robert Brent, a teratologist who has served on occasion
as an expert witness, believes that scientific experts are tempted to
give unreliable testimony not only for money, but for the ego grat-
ification of being the respected center of attention. 2 Dr. Brent
maintains that experts are willing to express opinions in the court-
room they would not air in a scientific forum.7 Testimony given
in court is unlikely to find its way back into the scientific commu-
nity, where careless, unprofessionally biased, or false statements
would damage an expert's professional reputation. 4 Indeed, Dr.
Brent suggests that experts would be more responsible if deposi-
69. FED. R. EvID. 702 & advisory committee's note; see also Habecker v. Copperloy
Corp., 893 F.2d 49, 51 (3rd Cir. 1990) (case law, in addition to the rule and the advisory
supporting the liberal admission of expert testimony).
70. See, e.g., Brent, The Irresponsible Expert Witness: A Failure of Biomedical
Graduate Education and Professional Accountability, 70 PEDIATRICS 754, 754 (1982)
(discussing the lack of adequate controls on the quality of expert witnesses); Milunsky, The
Medical Expert Witness, 14 LAW MED & HEALTH CARE 2, 2 (1986) (addressing the
problem of unqualified medical expert testimony); Blum, Experts: How Good Are They?,
Nat'l L.J., July 24, 1989, at 1, col. 4 (discussing attention currently being focused on the
problem of unreliable expert testimony); Saxe, The Expert Witness, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 1,
1989, at 2, col. 3 (depicting a disingenuous expert witness).
71. See Brent, supra note 70, at 755.
72. Id. at 760.
73. See id. at 755.
74. See id. at 761. For a recent example of the backlash that can follow the an-
nouncement of inadequately supported findings in the scientific community, see Broad,
'Cold Fusion' Claimants Review Puzzling Results, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 3, 1990, at C8, col. 2.
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tion and trial testimony were exposed to peer review. 75 This re-
form has not been implemented, and there remains a belief that
one can find an "expert" to support any proposition, no matter
how contrary to the truth. 6
Courts are not bound to accept all expert evidence the parties
proffer. Even the testimony of expert witnesses with appropriate
credentials may be rejected as unpersuasive if the court deter-
mines that their opinions are not based on appropriate founda-
tions. For example, at least three courts have found unpersuasive
the testimony by Dr. Alan K. Done, a physician who is among a
minority of scientific voices proclaiming that the drug Bendectin
causes human birth defects. 7 At a time when the vast majority of
scientific opinion held that the drug is entirely safe for the fetus
when taken by the mother, Dr. Done was prepared to testify on
behalf of parents of damaged babies that Bendectin caused the
harm, citing studies that birth defects in some animals can be in-
duced by doses of Bendectin.7 a Epidemiological studies on humans
- statistical analyses of the incidence of human maladies with a
goal of identifying their causes - have failed to reveal a terato-
genic hazard from Bendectin.7 9 While the overwhelming majority
of teratologists and medical experts are convinced that this evi-
dence refutes the earlier animal studies, Dr. Done apparently re-
mains unconvinced.80
As noted earlier, the testimony of experts is liberally admit-
ted." Thus, while not impossible, it currently is very difficult to
convince a court to exclude the proffered testimony of an individ-
ual who has adequate scientific credentials and offers to testify
about the results of tests which, like animal studies, are accepted
75. Id. Dr. Brent's proposed remedy also includes better education of experts as to
their roles in litigation, as well as other steps toward enforcing greater responsibility; see
also Milunsky, supra note 70, at 2, (arguing for certification of expertise by committees of
scholars in the relevant fields).
76. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 473, 482 (1986).
77. See Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., Nos. 87-7214, 87-7219 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9,
1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649
F. Supp. 799, 803 (D.D.C. 1986), affid, 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Lynch v. Merrell-
National Laboratories, 646 F. Supp. 856, 866-67 (D. Mass. 1986) aff'd, 830 F.2d 1190
(1st Cir. 1987).
78. Richardson, 649 F. Supp. at 801.
79. Lynch, 646 F. Supp. at 863-64; Shepard, Human Teratogenicity, 33 ADVANCES
IN PEDIATRICS 225, 255 (1986). For a comparative definition of epidemiology, see Dor-
land's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 566 (27th ed. 1988).
80. Richardson, 649 F. Supp. at 802.
81. See supra text accompanying note 69.
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tools of science.
C. Incentives and Results of Tort Suits
Suits alleging that a drug caused birth defects have the po-
tential to generate a multi-million dollar verdict for even a single,
bench-tried case. For example, in Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp.,82 a federal district judge awarded over five million dollars
to a mother and child where the child was alleged to have suffered
multiple birth defects from her mother's use of a contraceptive
spermicidal jelly.83
- When the damage awards are high enough, tort suits regulate
business decision-making. Perhaps the most dramatic example of
the regulatory power of tort actions is litigation over the drug
Bendectin. 84 Although morning sickness is often a non-acute con-
dition, in severe cases, it can cause starvation, ketosis, dehydra-
tion, and metabolic disturbances that can force a choice between
abortion to prevent irreversible metabolic damage and maternal
death.85 Thus, Bendectin is a drug that can make the burden of
pregnancy lighter and in some cases, safer.
There is a broad consensus in the medical community that
Bendectin does not cause birth defects.86 Indeed, of all drugs
about which birth defect research has been done, "Bendectin
stands in its own place as the agent about which there is the
greatest degree of certainty on its safety. '8 7 Notwithstanding the
overwhelming medical opinion that Bendectin is a safe drug, law-
suits brought by parents of children with birth defects are le-
gion.8 Mounting a defense can be prohibitively expensive, and in
1983, Merrell Dow, the manufacturer of Bendectin, withdrew the
drug from the market.89 A Merrell Dow spokesman recently ex-
plained that the company "find[s] that marketing products for use
82. 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985), modified, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1986)
(award reduced to approximately $4.7 million), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986).
83. Id. at 296-98.
84. See supra note 1.
85. Walters, The Management of Nausea and Vomiting During Pregnancy, 147
MED. J. OF AUSTRALIA 290, 291 (1987).
86. See id.; Shepard, supra note 79, at 255.
87. Shepard, supra note 79, at 255.
88. See Richardson, 857 F.2d at 824. (Over 1500 Bendectin lawsuits were consoli-
dated with the Richardson case for pretrial proceedings in the Southern District of Ohio).
89. Ross, supra note 3, at A19, col. 2.
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during pregnancy is just an invitation to litigation."90
The "invitation to litigation" was widely distributed in the
case of Bendectin. In 1979 alone, the drug was prescribed to one
million new users.91 Doctors estimate that the background rate of
major congenital malformations, that is, the percent of children
born with a major malformation not attributed to a particular
cause, is two to five percent.92 Thus, of the million women who
took Bendectin during 1979 to combat morning sickness during
pregnancy, approximately 20,000 to 50,000 could be expected to
bear a child suffering from birth defects even if Bendectin does
nothing to increase the likelihood of a defect.9" Since a chemi-
cally-induced defect may be indiscernible from a defect of genetic
or unknown cause,94 a drug company faces the seemingly inevita-
ble prospect of defending against a multitude of claims for defects
its product did not cause. A drug manufacturer undertakes a sub-
stantial risk in such litigation, since "[t]he sight of a helpless mu-
tilated youngster may evoke emotion along with the corresponding
wish to make somebody pay for his or her plight . . . [so] the
presence of handicapped youngsters could render a jury 'unable to
arrive at an unbiased judgment.' ""
A plaintiff's emotional advantage in birth defect litigation un-
doubtedly contributes to high damage awards.96 For example, in
1987, when even though an overwhelming medical consensus sup-
ported Bendectin's safety to the unborn, a jury assessed $20 mil-
lion compensatory and $75 million punitive damages in a single
90. Id. at A19, cols. 2-3.
91. See Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories, 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st Cir.
1987).
92. See, Congenital Malformations, in NELSON TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRICS 311
(12th ed. 1983).
93. This analysis assumes the one million prescriptions were all for morning sickness
and that the women for whom the drug was prescribed took it. The range of 20,000 to
50,000 birth defects is merely a rough estimate since it ignores miscarriages, multiple
births, and any other confounding factors. Despite these inaccuracies, the estimate illus-
trates the magnitude of the threat of litigation a company faces when marketing a drug
that may be used during pregnancy. Moreover, it was estimated in 1981 that over 30 mil-
lion women had taken Bendectin. Kolata, Jury Exonerates Bendectin in Mekdeci Case,
212 SCIENCE 647 (1981). This suggests that the number of potential plaintiffs worldwide is
between 600,000 and 1.5 million persons.
94. See Ross, supra note 3, at A19, col. 6.
95. Lynch, 830 F.2d at 1196; (quoting In re Richardson-Merrell, 624 F. Supp. 1212,
1224 (S.D. Ohio 1985) ("It is clear that the presence at trial . . . of children suffering
form severe visible birth defects is inherently prejudicial."), afl'd in part and vacated and
remanded in part, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 788 (1989).
96. Huber, supra note 13, at 323.
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case brought on behalf of one child against the defendant manu-
facturer of Bendectin. Even though the typical award is much
less, the knowledge that selling the drug may create 50,000 poten-
tial plaintiffs, even if using the drug does absolutely nothing to
increase the probability of a birth defect, makes lawsuits a power-
ful disincentive to market a drug. One lesson of the Bendectin liti-
gation is that these suits can drive a drug off the market, even
when the scientific community pronounced it safe and doctors pre-
scribed it to a million new users in 1979 alone.
The message manufacturers may receive from the filing of
actions for failure to warn and the high damage awards may not
be that they must respond to new information by issuing warn-
ings, but that it is a mistake to sell drugs for use during preg-
nancy.98 Despite FDA approval of the drug Bendectin and its
warning information, and a strong scientific consensus that it is
not a teratogen, the regulatory power of private tort actions forced
it from the market. Put another way, the FDA's decision that a
drug should be added to the nation's pharmacopoeia was reversed
by the economic force of lawsuits brought against the overwhelm-
ing weight of scientific evidence that Bendectin does not cause
birth defects.
The same process that made Bendectin unavailable to women
suffering from morning sickness can be brought to bear against
other drugs. Plaintiffs' attorneys are alert to possible new drug
suits and, after identifying an allegedly dangerous drug, have been
known to seek clients by advertising for them. 99 One result is a
current concern that the threat of litigation based on ephemeral
scientific evidence has reduced the contraceptive options available
to Americans. 100 This same process may remove other FDA-ap-
97. Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 83-3504 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 1987) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file), rev'd, Nos. 87-7214, 87-7219 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9 1990) (LEXIS
Genfed library, USApp file) (the court upheld the $20 million compensatory award, but
granted a remittitur on full amount of the award of $75 million in punitive damages based
on insufficient evidence of actual malice).
98. See Ross, supra note 3, at A19, cols. 2-3.
99. Beardsley, Drug not Guilty, Says Court, 314 NATURE 209 (1985) (discussing
the fact that some attorneys continue to advertise for cases involving women who took
Bendectin during pregnancy and gave birth to children with birth defects); Kolata, supra
note 93, at 647 (same).
100. Isaacs & Holt, Drug Regulation, Product Liability, and the Contraceptive
Crunch: Choices are Dwindling, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 533, 539 (1987); Rosenfield, Modern
Contraception. a 1989 Update, 10 ANN. REV. OF PUB. HEALTH 385, 394, 398 (1989); see
also A No-Choice Policy on Birth Control, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 26, 1990 at
14, 15 (suggesting that the reduction from nine U.S. corporations doing contraceptive re-
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proved drugs from the marketplace.
III. THE DEBATE OVER PREEMPTION
Debate over lawsuits for failure to warn about possible side
effects often focuses on whether FDA approval of a drug should
preempt tort actions. Several scholarly, well-written articles have
advocated preemption, °10 while others have opposed placing the
final decision in the regulators' hands." 2
The advocates of preemption point out that a lay jury is not
as capable as the scientists and doctors of the FDA at identifying
the side effects of drugs.'03 Accordingly, preemption advocates ar-
gue that FDA approval should preclude lawsuits for failure to
warn because the experts have already decided the drug does
more good than harm.0 4
Opponents of preemption point out that the FDA approval
process is not focused on the rights of individuals who are injured
by drug side effects, 0 5 or that, despite expertise in pharmacology
or medicine, the FDA makes its choices without a popular man-
date. 0 6 When a drug poses risks different from its benefits, as
with the first oral contraceptives which prevented pregnancy and
preserved sexual spontaneity but carried slight risks of blindness
or even death, scientific expertise may be less useful than jurors'
consciences.'0 7 The former chief counsel of the FDA, Richard A.
Merrill, expressed particular skepticism at the notion that mathe-
search to one over the past thirty years stems from a desire to avoid lawsuits).
101. E.g., Huber, supra note 13, at 288-90 (discussing one manufacturer's reluc-
tance to produce a drug because the manufacturer has been held liable for damages alleged
to have resulted from that drug and calling for preemption of tort suits for FDA-approved
drugs and federal regulation to reduce tort liability); Walsh & Klein, supra note 9, at 179
(advocating federal preemption as a solution to restore product liability law to its original
purpose); Comment, Prescription Drug Labeling, supra note 14 (advocating preemption
based on supremacy clause and expertise concerns).
102. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 42, at 233 (stating that value judgments about
product liability are better left to the courts than the FDA); Merrill, Risk-Benefit Deci-
sionmaking by the Food and Drug Administration, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 994, 1008-12
(1977) (discussing the difficult task facing the FDA in the approval process); Comment,
Federal Preemption and the FDA: What Does Congress Want?, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 263
(1989) (relying on an absence of express preemptive language by Congress).
103. See Huber, supra note 13, at 335; Walsh & Klein, supra note 9, at 193.
104. See Huber, supra note 13, at 332-35; Walsh & Klein, supra note 9, at 193.
105. See Cooper, supra note 42, at 234.
106. See Merrill, supra note 102, at 996.
107. Cf. id. at 1011 (asserting that choice between risks and benefits should be made
through "procedures that permit public participation").
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matical or medical expertise helps the FDA make choices where
the risks and benefits of a drug are not comparable."0 8 Further,
some authors note that the threat of litigation may make manu-
facturers refine their drugs to achieve greater safety." 9
The threat of private litigation may be more effective than
FDA regulation at insuring that drug companies reveal research
results to the FDA. For example, one drug manufacturer withheld
adverse research results from the FDA concerning triparanol, a
drug sold to reduce blood cholesterol sold under the name "MER/
29."110 The jury found that the manufacturer withheld from the
FDA results of studies done cooperatively with two other pharma-
ceutical companies that had reported eye damage in research
monkeys."' In fact, the drug can cause cataracts and some skin
problems in humans." 2 One woman on the research team resigned
rather than endorse the false report.113 Her husband related the
story of the falsification to an FDA inspector with whom he car
pooled, and a federal investigation was launched." 4
Three Merrell employees pleaded nolo contendere to criminal
charges, and the company was fined the maximum allowed by
law, $80,000.115 Meanwhile, civil suits against Merrell "ultimately
cost the company between $45 and $55 million." 116 Thus, the im-
pact of civil litigation can be a vastly more powerful financial in-
centive for honesty than an inconsequential maximum fine.
Courts, though, have been unwilling-to preempt, on the basis
of FDA approval of a drug, state tort actions for failure to
warn.' 17 FDA approval of warning language has been viewed as a
minimum standard manufacturers must meet, and not as an indi-
cator of all warnings a reasonable manufacturer would issue."'
108. See id. at 1008.
109. Isaacs & Holt, supra note 100, at 539 (citing Galen, Birth Control Options
Limited By Litigation, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 28, col. 1).
110. S. FREDMAN & R. BURGER, FORBIDDEN CURES 17 (1976).
111. Id.
112. See id. For a discussion of the MER/29 scandal in the popular press, see Dowie
& Marshall, The Bendectin Cover-Up, MOTHER JONES, Nov. 1988, at 46.
113. See S. FREDMAN & R. BURGER, supra note 110, at 17.
114. See id.
115. See Dowie & Marshall, supra note 112, at 46.
116. S. FREDMAN & R. BURGER, supra note 110, at 17.
117. See supra note 15.
118. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658 (1st Cir. 1981)
("approval by the FDA of the [warning] language involved is not necessarily conclusive on
the question of the adequacy of the warnings."); Walsh & Klein, supra note 9, at 185-88
(discussing state court decisions premised on this point).
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Thus, a company may be liable for omitting to print warning lan-
guage the FDA explicitly rejected for a drug's package insert.11 9
An inquiry into the failure to adequately warn may derive from
provisions of the federal food and drug regulations which indicate
that a manufacturer may strengthen its warning beyond the warn-
ing approved by the FDA.120 In practice, however, the bare legal
right to make a warning more strict than the FDA requires may
be illusory for a manufacturer whose livelihood may depend sig-
nificantly upon maintaining the agency's good will. 21 A former
Chief Counsel of the FDA observed that, while a review of the
applicable law would lead to the conclusion that manufacturers
can act contrary to the FDA's will, the "FDA . . .retains, as a
practical matter, complete control over package inserts.1 22
Preemption of tort suits upon FDA approval of warning lan-
guage would stop approved drugs from being driven off the mar-
ket by litigation. However, preemption would also stop the regula-
tory power of tort suits from providing manufacturers an incentive
to improve drug safety and information,123 leaving the FDA as the
sole arbiter of how much warning information should be issued.
Even accepting as true that the experts at the FDA are the only
appropriate parties to decide the proper content of warnings, there
remains a question of how quickly the FDA is able to process the
blizzard of new information constantly being developed about the
multitude of products under FDA jurisdiction. Currently, the
FDA can rely on the incentives of the tort system to encourage
manufacturers to continue research, reveal research results hon-
estly, monitor scientific literature, and request or issue appropriate
warnings. Preemption would remove those incentives, and it is un-
clear whether the FDA could adequately review drug information
under its current staffing and budget without the support of pri-
vate lawsuits. Further, as the MER/29 scandal demonstrates, the
threat of civil litigation by drug users who are not warned of side
119. See, e.g., Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 325 Kan. 387, 409, 681
P.2d 1038, 1057 (1984) (warning actually included with defendant's oral contraceptive
may be found inadequate even though a similar warning, sufficient to satisfy the duty to
warn the plaintiff, had been previously rejected by the FDA), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965
(1984).
120. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(2) (1989).
121. Cooper, supra note 42, at 236.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 237.
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effects makes misleading the FDA a riskier proposition. 124
It may be possible to establish rules within the current litiga-
tion framework that retain the desirable incentives provided by
tort actions, yet leave manufacturers confident that plaintiffs will
not prevail when they fail to produce reliable scientific evidence
that a warning could have been made on the basis of information
then available to the manufacturers. Judges with a greater under-
standing of the structure of scientific proof could set more appro-
priate duties to warn, summarily dismissing suits that rely on evi-
dence the relevant scientific community would find unreliable.
Thus, liability in tort would occur only when the evidence
presented would also be acceptable to competent experts in that
field.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
Because there is no liability for a drug manufacturer's failure
to warn users about unknown hazards, 2 5 and because scientists
around the world are adding constantly to the body of scientific
knowledge, there can come a point in time before which no warn-
ing need be issued as to a given drug, and after which omission of
a warning becomes tortious. 26 For this reason, the timing of sci-
entific discoveries and warnings can be crucial. In the absence of
preemption by FDA approval, an understanding of how scientific
knowledge is developed and disseminated is vital for the bench
and bar in drug side-effect litigation.
A. The Dissemination of Scientific Knowledge
The principal mechanism by which scientists make their re-
sults known is through publication in scientific journals. 2 The
publication of research has implications for both the investigator
and the scientific community. First, translating one's findings into
a publishable article requires accuracy and logical thinking. 8
124. See supra text accompanying notes 110-116.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 55-63.
126. Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969) ("when chloro-
quine was first developed and tested, there was no known or foreseeable risk of idiosyn-
cratic retinal damage [, but] . . . [w]hen the risk became apparent . . . a duty to warn
attached.").
127. See Zuckerman, The Sociology of Science, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY 515
(N. Smelser ed. 1988).
128. J. ZIMAN, RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE: AN EXPLORATION OF THE GROUNDS FOR
BELIEF IN SCIENCE 132 (1978).
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Second, the editors of most journals distribute articles submitted
for publication to a panel of scientists in the relevant discipline."2 9
Research that is obviously flawed or unreliable may be kept out of
the prestigious scientific publications this way. Third, once an arti-
cle is published, it is available to the scientific community to be
read, tested by further experimentation, and criticized.130 Thus,
the researchers place their reputations at risk, to rise or fall with
the perceived merit of their work.13 1 Some sociologists of science
see peer review as the central mechanism insuring the reliability
of scientific knowledge.' 32
Other observers of science point out that the power of peer
review has decreased dramatically in the past few decades . 33
They note that, in the modern career of science, publications are
the "basic currency of credit" for obtaining tenure, government
grants, and the respect of the scientific community. 34 The incen-
tive system confronting scientists ensures that articles will be pub-
lished even if they make only a very small contribution to the
body of scientific knowledge.' 35 There is also a strong need to be
the first to publish a result, as respect and grants go to the first
discoverer and not to the scientists who later confirm a phenome-
non. 138 The drive to publish for prestige and career advancement
generates a flood of articles of marginal worth in medical and sci-
entific journals. 37 Apparently, the two traditional instruments of
quality control that encourage scientists to perform and publish
worthy research, peer review before articles are accepted for pub-
lication and peer reaction after the work is published, are less ef-
fective today than they were just two decades ago because "the
129. Large & Michie, Proving that the Strength of the British Navy Depends on the
Number of Old Maids in England: A Comparison of Scientific Proof with Legal Proof, 11
ENVTL L. 557, 580 (1981).
130. Id.; see also J. ZIMAN, supra note 128, at 75-76 (noting the value of peer review
even for research using good experimental technique).
131. Zuckerman, supra note 127, at 526-28; Large & Michie, supra note 129, at
580; see also Broad, supra note 74, at C8, col. 2.
132. See J. ZIMAN, supra note 128 at 75-76, 107-08; Zuckerman, supra note 127, at
524-25.
133. W. BROAD & N. WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH 52-55 (1982).
134. Id. at 53; cf. Mills, Reporting Provocative Results: Can We Publish 'Hot' Pa-
pers Without Getting Burned?, 258 J. A.M.A. 3428, 3429 (stating that less emphasis by
universities on the volume of a researcher's publications would serve to reduce the number
of articles of marginal value) (1987).
135. W. BROAD & N. WADE, supra note 133, at 53-54.
136. See Zuckerman, supra note 127, at 531.
137. See W. BROAD & N. WADE, supra note 133, at 54.
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excessive proliferation of scientific papers ...clutter[s] up the
communications system of science[,] . ..protecting bad research
from scrutiny."' 8 For this reason, some observers of the scientific
community conclude that the majority of scientific publications
have "little or even zero impact on the forward march of
knowledge."' 39
Even disregarding any erosion of the quality control on publi-
cation of scientific articles, one could not safely accept as true the
conclusions of recent or path-breaking articles in even the most
prominent journals. Research leads scientists down many promis-
ing blind alleys before establishing a scientific fact. Thus, while
ninety percent of the science in a high school textbook is probably
accurate, having withstood the tests of time in the scientific com-
munity, ninety percent of the science in the most prestigiou3 re-
search journals may be false.140 Nonetheless, the published litera-
ture remains the best measure of the state of scientific knowledge
at a given point in time."'
Regardless of their underlying merit, scientific discoveries
usually do not burst into the scientific press and gain immediate
acceptance. For example, a well-designed research paper showing
a strong correlation between cigarette smoking and lung cancer,
today regarded as a "seminal publication in its field," met with
great resistance upon release-in 1950.142 Eleven years later, the
question of whether smoking caused lung cancer was still suffi-
ciently at issue to justify publishing a debate between two re-
searchers in The New England Journal of Medicine. 143 Even then,
the causal connection had not been accepted widely as a scientific
fact.'4 The history of science is replete with examples of resis-
tance to new findings, 4 5 and not without cause, since erroneous
138. Id. at 221.
139. Id. at 54 (citing Cole & Cole, The Ortega Hypothesis, 178 SCIENCE 368-75
(1972)).
140. See J. ZIMAN, supra note 128, at 40.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 127-132.
142. Engelken, The Smoking Gun, OUTLOOK, Winter, 1988, at 20 (published by
Wash. U. School of Med.).
143. Little, Some Phases of the Problem of Smoking and Lung Cancer, 264 NEW
ENG. J. OF MED. 1241 (1961) (maintaining that insufficient evidence existed to show a
causal link between smoking and lung cancer); Wynder, An Appraisal of the Smoking-
Lung-Cancer Issue, 264 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1235 (1961) (accepting the evidence that
smoking causes lung cancer).
144. See Little, supra note 143, at 1245.
145. For a seminal article on this issue, see Barber, Resistance by Scientists to Sci-
entific Discovery, 134 SCIENCE 596 (1961). For an interesting discussion of a current medi-
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conclusions are very much a, part of the process of scientific
discovery.
B. The Development of Scientific Knowledge About Teratogens
The challenge of predicting a drug's teratogenicity is particu-
larly difficult. First, direct evidence as to a drug's effect on preg-
nant women is unavailable before a drug is released because drugs
are never tested on pregnant women.146 Second, animal research
may be of limited value because certain drugs, such as aspirin, are
teratogenic to some laboratory animals but not humans, 47 while
other drugs may be teratogenic to man alone.1 48 Teratologists
know that "[e]xtrapolation from animal data to humans is diffi-
cult with the best of data and is very risky with poor data."' 49 It is
axiomatic to teratologists that "any agent administered at the
proper dose level, at the proper stage of development to embryos
of some species will cause disturbances in the development of the
embryo or the fetus.115 0  This axiom, known as Karnofsky's
Law, 5 1 means that any substance, no matter how safe for human
use, can be made to produce defects in animal experimentation. 52
Thus, a review of medical literature may include reports of ter-
atogenicity in animals that do not imply a similar effect in
humans. Third, because a percentage of babies who are not ex-
posed to any teratogenic agents are born with defects, the best
way science has devised to separate naturally occurring birth de-
fects from those caused by drugs is through after-the-fact statisti-
cal research controversy and scientists' reluctance to accept the implications of new find-
ings, see Hall, A Molecular Code Links Emotions, Mind and Health, SMITHSONIAN, June
1989, at 62.
146. Ackerman, supra note 7, at 13.
147. Rats show a teratogenic response to dose levels of aspirin, while humans do not.
Schwetz, supra note 37, at 179.
148. The sedative Thalidomide was tested extensively in animals before its use in
man. The drug, a powerful teratogen in humans, caused 'no birth defects in laboratory
animals. See Sherman & Strauss, Thalidomide: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 41 FoOD
DRUG COsm. L.J. 458, 459-61 (1986).
149. Schwetz, supra note 37, at 179; see Shepard, supra note 79, at 227.
150. Id. at 180 (emphasis in original).
151. "Most teratologists accept the principle that any agent can be shown to be tera-
togenic in an animal providing enough is given at the right time. For instance, both sodium
chloride and sucrose have been shown to produce animal teratogenicity. This concept is
used so often by teratologists that some have found it useful to call it Karnofsky's princi-
ple." Shepard, supra note 79, at 227.
152. Cf. infra note 187 (discussion of an analogous situation in the use of fetal ultra-
sound examinations).
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cal studies of large populations. Detecting even a very potent ter-
atogen could require a sample of as many as 200,000 births.' 53 A
weak teratogen, one that causes defects in only a small percent of
those babies whose mothers take the drug, might only be detected
upon review of data concerning a million births or more. 54 Birth
defect data is not compiled or reviewed routinely across the
United States, although some defect monitoring programs review
as many as 100,000 births per year.1 55 Thus, the task of collecting
the data necessary to identify a teratogenic effect might only be
completed many years after a drug is released. Delays can be ex-
pected to arise from "possible incompleteness or inaccuracy of re-
porting, and delays in reporting of the defects, data processing,
and statistical analysis.' ' 5
6
It is not surprising, given the pressures to publish and the
difficulty of detecting or predicting teratogenicity, that scientific
articles have incorrectly suggested teratogenicity in agents not
currently believed to cause birth defects. Significantly, a study
that purports to identify a formerly unsuspected teratogen is in-
herently more important than one that fails to find a relationship
between a drug and birth defects. This is because a finding that a
drug causes birth defects may affect treatment decisions, while a
negative finding as to an agent not previously thought to be tera-
togenic will not. Perhaps more important, a negative finding
proves only that one particular research design, as applied to one
group of subjects, failed to yield a statistically significant result.'57
It does not prove the safety of the drug being tested, but only that
the procedure failed to detect an association. It is only when the
additional logical link is present-that the design and execution of
a given research project would have disclosed a relationship if one
153. Khoury & Holtzman, On the Ability of Birth Defects Monitoring to Detect
New Teratogens, 126 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 136, 138-39 (1987).
154. Id. at 139 (Table 2).
155. Id. at 141.
156. Id.
157. The eminent philosopher of science, Sir Karl Popper, explained the theoretical
value of a negative finding in scientific research with his frequently-cited example of the
hypothesis that no swans are black. One must examine every swan in the world to prove
this hypothesis, and that is impossible. Moreover, proof of the existence of one black swan
will show the hypothesis false. Thus, the hypothesis that no swans are black (or, by anal-
ogy, that a certain drug cannot cause a birth defect) can never be proven, and is subject to
disproof by a single contrary example. K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
101 n.l (Harper Torchbook trans. 1968).
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existed-that negative findings are persuasive.'58
It is natural that the first study to be published will be one
purporting to find proof of a teratogenic effect: 59
It is quite common in epidemiology for the first published stud-
ies of an association to suggest a positive association, with subse-
quent reports being negative; . . . The reason for this is fairly
obvious. Investigators are more likely to Write up positive find-
ings, reviewers to consider them of interest, editors to publish
them, and the press to publicize them. It is only after the initial
observation is published that investigators who have negative
data feel obliged to report them. 6'
Indeed, the medical profession currently is concerned that the bias
against publication of negative results may reduce the information
available for use in reaching decisions about patient care.' 6 '
Nonetheless, negative results remain largely unavailable to doc-
tors faced with treatment decisions.
Despite the justified caution with which a first study purport-
ing to find teratogenicity is greeted, it nevertheless can be accu-
rate, and once a study appears in print, the scientific community is
on notice of the research conducted.'6 2 If a single study suggests
that a drug may be teratogenic and the drug is sold without a
warning after the publication date, a lawyer whose client used the
drug and gave birth to a damaged baby has the basic elements of
a suit for failure to warn.'63 Even if there is a strong reaction
against the study and the scientific community considers it refuted
by later research or criticism, the existence of the study could,
depending upon the law's view of when a duty to warn arises, cre-
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., Bracken, Spermicidal Contraceptives and Poor Reproductive Out-
comes: The Epidemiologic Evidence Against an Association, 151 AM. J. OBSTETRICS AND
GYNECOLOGY 552, 555 (1985) (negative data on relation between spermicide and malfor-
mations were not reported until publication of reports suggesting a positive correlation).
160. Id.; see also Wachter, Disturbed at Meta- Analysis?, 241 SCIENCE 1407, 1408
(1988) (analysis of published research is skewed if only the reports indicating a statistically
significant relationship are published while those indicating otherwise are not).
161. Altman, Doctors Concerned About Unpublished Results, N.Y. Times, May 16,
1989, at C5, col. 1.
162. Years ago, researchers could publish findings about which they were uncertain
in obscure journals that would not be read. In this way, they could protect their claims to
discovery of some new phenomenon while risking little loss of prestige if their research was
without merit. Today, however, computerized research makes it much less likely that a so-
called "buried" publication will evade the notice of one researching a particular topic.
Mills, supra note 134, at 3428.
163. See generally supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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ate an issue of fact regarding the reasonableness of selling a drug
without a warning.
V. COURT-IMPOSED STANDARDS OF DRUG MANUFACTURERS'
DUTY TO WARN
As people are exposed to a newly released drug and reports of
possible adverse reactions accumulate, a body of data develops
that may allow epidemiologists and medical researchers to identify
a drug's hitherto unknown side effects. Courts have held that the
dangers about which a manufacturer must warn may change as
new information about side effects emerges.16 4
A drug manufacturer is held to the standard of an expert in
the field of drug side effects. 5 That is, the duty to warn extends
beyond actual knowledge the manufacturer gains from research it
performs to include knowledge available to an expert through the
scientific literature.'66 Because scientific literature is constantly
growing, manufacturers are under a continuing duty to monitor
scientific developments and update their warnings. 67 Merely im-
posing an ongoing duty to monitor and warn, however, leaves un-
resolved the inevitable issue of how much and what kind of evi-
dence must be amassed before a duty to warn obtains.
A. Warn Upon a Hint of a Possibility of Danger
Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 68 illustrates one possi-
ble standard of how much evidence will result in a court finding a
duty to warn: a hint of a possibility of a side effect requires a
warning. In Wells, the parents of a child born with multiple con-
genital anomalies sued Ortho, the manufacturer of a spermicide
cream that the child's mother used for contraception. The District
164. See Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969) (defendant
manufacturer of drug chlorquine had duty to warn when previously unknown danger be-
came apparent); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc, 399 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968)
(duty to warn attached when danger from taking polio vaccine became apparent.)
165. McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 386, 528 P.2d 522, 528
(1974) (drug manufacturer treated as an expert and its duty to warn is commensurate with
its constructive knowledge of the scientific literature and other sources).
166. Id.
167. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir. 1970) (drug
manufacturer has a continuous duty to keep abreast of scientific knowledge concerning the
side effects of its drugs).
168. 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985), modified, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986).
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Court in Wells imposed a duty to warn on the drug manufacturer
"as soon as there was a 'hint' of a possibility that the Product
causes birth defects."'16 A "'hint' of a possibility" is any amount
of scientific evidence.17 0 If held to this warning requirement, drug
companies would have to issue warnings whenever any research of
any kind could be read to suggest a teratogenic effect. Thus,
whether the underlying research were epidemiological, animal-
based, or in vitro, and regardless of its reliability, the company is
bound under Wells to issue a warning based upon a "'hint' of a
possibility.'' Moreover, when considered in light of the tendency
for the first published study concerning teratogenicity to report a
positive result' 72 and with Karnofsky's Law guaranteeing that at
some dosage any drug will cause birth defects in some species,17 3
it would appear this standard threatens to impose liability for fail-
ure to warn upon evidence that a significant majority of experts in
the field would consider grossly insufficient.
Among the medical authorities cited in Wells by the plain-
tiffs' expert and the judge, who sat as the trier of fact, was a study
published in the Journal of the American Medical Association in
1981 .17 The 1981 study suggested that the question of whether
169. Id. at 294.
170. See id.
171. In the years since Wells was decided, no court has either adopted or rejected
this standard with a citation to Wells. Although a similar standard is stated in Lindsay v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that New York law
requires manufacturers to "warn of all potential dangers which it knew, or in the exercise
of reasonable care should have known, to exist.") (citations omitted), the court in Lindsay
cited only one New York decision on this point, Baker v. St. Agnes Hospital, 70 A.D.2d
400, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). Baker in no way supports the proposition
that New York requires drug manufacturers to warn of "all potential dangers." Instead,
the Baker court held that a "manufacturer is under a duty to warn the medical profession
of dangers inherent in its biological drugs which, in the exercise of reasonable care, it knew
or should have known to exist." Id. at 405, 421 N.Y.2d at 85. Unfortunately, one New
York court appears to have adopted the error in Lindsay, albeit in dicta. See Ullman v.
Grant, 114 Misc. 2d 220, 220, 450 N.Y.S.2d 955, 956 (N.Y, Sup. Ct. 1981) (The court
found that the plaintiff did "not state a cause of action for breach of warranty since it is
not the duty of the pharmacist to warn of possible side effects in the use of a drug but
rather the duty of the drug manufacturer and prescribing physician to warn of any possible
adverse reaction. ... ).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has stated a less rigorous standard when it ap-
plied Connecticut law. For a discussion of that standard, see Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
41.6 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969); infra notes 194, 202-06 and accompanying text.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 159-61.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 150-52.
174. 615 F. Supp. at 272 n.12 (discussing Jick, et al., Vaginal Spermicides and Con-
genital Disorders, 245 J. A.M.A. 1329 (1981).
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the spermicide was a teratogen deserved further study and pru-
dently identified its conclusions as "tentative until confirmed by
other data.175 The authors' "comment" section discussed the fact
that the children born of mothers who used the spermicide, but
nonetheless became pregnant, bore children with no one set of
deformities.' 76 The article acknowledged that "[t]he absence of a
single, well-defined syndrome among the infants whose mothers
used spermicides raises doubt about a causal connection between
these agents and the disorders noted.' 7
In fact, subsequent research failed to confirm the findings of
the study.' 78 One of the investigators who worked on the original
1981 study, Dr. Richard N. Watkins, wrote to the Journal of the
American Medical Association, the periodical that published the
original study, and recanted the study's tentative conclusion. 9
Dr. Watkins attributed the inaccuracy of the study to its assump-
tion that any woman who had a prescription for spermicides
within approximately eleven months of conception had actually
been using the drug.180 Dr. Watkins also reported that an expert
FDA panel considered the study and concluded in 1983 that it
was "unpersuasive because of poor design and unsupported by
well-designed studies."'' Despite the weakness of the study and
its expressed reservations and its disclaimer of a positive conclu-
sion, the plaintiffs were allowed to call a physician to testify that
the study raised a serious question about the safety of the spermi-
cide.1'8 While the Watkins letter itself was not written until after
the Wells case was decided, it demonstrates that as early as 1983,
the study had fallen into disrepute in the scientific community and
was little more than a hint of a possibility that the spermicide
could have caused the plaintiff's birth defect.
Application of the hint of a possibility standard stated in
Wells mocks the purpose of warnings. First, Karnofsky's Law in-
sures that a hint of a possibility of teratogenicity will be found for
175. Jick, supra note 174, at 1332.
176. Id. at 1331-32.
177. Id. at 1332.
178. Bracken, supra note 160, at 554.
179. Watkins, Vaginal Spermicides and Congenital Disorders: The Validity of a
Study, 256 J. A.M.A. 3095, 3095 (1986).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Wells, 615 F. Supp. at 272.
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almost every drug in use.183 Moreover, long after the medical and
scientific communities have determined that a given agent does
not cause birth defects in humans, the research hinting at the op-
posite conclusion will still exist, and will still raise the possibility
of a teratogenic effect. An equivalent to Shepard's Citations for
medical literature, which would enable doctors and scientists to
know readily which articles have been superceded, contradicted,
or disproved, does not exist. Thus, for example, if the warning re-
quirement of Wells were adopted, aspirin would require a warning
about birth defects, since it is a teratogen in some animals.8 4 As-
pirin's known teratogenicity in animals has never been shown in
humans and the drug is regarded as safe for use during preg-
nancy;' nonetheless, evidence of an association in animal studies
undoubtedly rises to the level of a hint of a possibility.
Issuing warnings on such flimsy evidence would create several
problems. First, women who have taken the drug and are pregnant
when the warning is issued may choose to abort the fetus based on
a mere hint of a possibility.'86 Women who are more cautious may
have a sonogram performed to ascertain whether the fetus is de-
formed. Sonography is not currently believed to pose a threat to
the fetus, but research indicates that there is at least a hint of a
possibility that fetuses may suffer neurological damage from so-
nograms.187 Second, valuable therapeutic agents might be made
unavailable to pregnant women. If the warning is Inade directly to
183. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
184. See Schwetz, supra note 37, at 185.
185. Id.
186. Teratologist Robert Brent reported that he personally knew of seven "tragic and
unnecessary abortions [that] occurred in the weeks following [a] National Enquirer arti-
cl" proclaiming the dangers of Bendectin. Brent, The Bendectin Saga: Another American
Tragedy, 27 Teratology 283, 284 (1983).
187. Sonography at higher intensity than is used for fetal examinations has caused
neurological damage in experimental animals. Kohorn, Pritchard & Hobbins, The Safety
of Clinical Ultrasonic Examination, 29 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 272, 273 (1967).
Current research overwhelmingly supports the safety of fetal ultrasound examination. See,
e.g., Stark, et al., Short- and Long-Term Risks After Exposure to Diagnostic Ultrasound
in Utero, 63 OSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 194, 194 (1984) (study found no biologically
significant differences between children exposed to diagnostic ultrasound in utero and unex-
posed children); id. (citing studies therein). However, it may still be possible to find a
physician who would write a letter to the editor of a respected journal asserting that the
research does not demonstrate the safety of fetal ultrasound examination. See, e.g., Reitz,
Risks After Exposure to Diagnostic Ul:rasound in Utero, 67 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
752, 752 (1986). This evidence, which the majority of scientific and medical experts appar-
ently do not consider an adequate basis for belief in a danger of ultrasound examination,
might well be held sufficient to require a warning under the hint of a possibility standard.
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the consumer, some consumers might choose to forego the benefi-
cial effects of a drug because of a warning based on scientifically
inadequate or even discredited evidence.' 88 If the warning were
given only to the medical profession, it is possible that doctors
would not prescribe the drug for pregnant women, fearing both
the adverse side effect and the possibility of litigation.
Ironically, there would be almost no safe avenue by which the
drug manufacturer could distinguish in its warnings between a
drug known to be a teratogen and one about which there is only a
discredited hint. Drug warnings must warn and not reassure. That
is, purported warnings that call into question the evidence under-
lying them do not protect the manufacturer from liability.'89 And
while there may be articles in the literature concluding that a
drug is not a teratogen, a warning in the Physicians' Desk Refer-
ence'90 ("PDR"), a standard reference for drug contraindications,
duplicates the manufacturer's warning. Therefore, a doctor who
goes no further than the PDR may not prescribe a useful drug
based on a scientifically unsupported warning under the hint stan-
dard.19' Even if the medical literature reported overwhelmingly
that a drug is safe, a warning in the PDR may constitute the basis
of a suit against the prescribing doctor, and the threat of litigation
could discourage use of the drug.
Perhaps the most dangerous result of requiring warnings on a
hint of a possibility is that those warnings may numb the attention
doctors and consumers pay to drug side-effect warnings in general.
Warning labels are an increasingly prevalent response to real or
imagined dangers of consumer products. 92 The volume of warn-
188. A drug manufacturer has a duty to warrr consumers rather than doctors regard-
ing an over-the-counter drug or a drug prescribed with lesser individualized consideration
of the patients' needs. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
189. See Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 481 F. Supp. 314, 325-26,
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (jury found that the warning issued by the manufacturer "unduly mini-
mized" risks from using birth control pills); Stahlheber v. American Cyanamid Co., 451
S.W.2d 48, 61-62 (Mo. 1970) (jury found that defendant's pamphlet discussing prevalent
opinion on the toxicity of defendant's product as a warning was inadequate).
190. MEDICAL EcONOMICS, INC., PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE (43d ed. 1989).
191. This author's informal discussions with physicians who regularly prescribe
drugs led to a conclusion that physicians rarely research a drug beyond the warnings in the
PDR or some similar reference before writing a prescription. E.g., Telephone conversation
with David A. Rier, Doctoral Candidate in Medical Sociology, Columbia University, April
9, 1990.
192. Britain, Product Honesty is the Best Policy: A Comparison of Doctors' and
Manufacturers' Duty to Disclose Drug Risks and the Importance of Consumer Expecta-
tions in Determining Product Defect, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 342, 385 (1984); Waldman, Do
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ings issued about a vast range of products threatens their effec-
tiveness. 193 If a general awareness develops that drug warnings are
founded on dubious evidence as a matter of course, the effect of
all warnings will lessen further.
Requiring warnings based on a mere hint of a possibility of a
teratogenic side effect has the potential of generating needless
panic, thereby denying the therapeutic benefits of drugs to pa-
tients who could benefit from its use without facing what medical
science would deem an appreciable risk. At the same time, the
variety of products believed safe for which such warnings would
have to be issued might dull the effect of warnings for drugs with
proven, dangerous side effects. Both effects combine to reduce the
value of drug warnings to society. As a matter of good social pol-
icy, failure to warn upon a hint of a possibility should not be a
basis for liability.
B. A Duty to Warn of "Apparent" Dangers
Some courts have held that a drug manufacturer must issue a
warning when the danger of a side effect is "apparent."' 94 The
decisions do not state explicitly to whom the danger must be ap-
parent, but the likely intent is that it must be apparent to reasona-
ble drug manufacturers, who are deemed experts in the field of
drug side effects.195 A corollary to the "apparent" standard is that
a drug company, although an expert in the field, cannot rely on
that expertise simply to disagree with existing scientific evidence
of a side effect, and thereby avoid the duty to warn. 196 Beyond the
bare use of the word "apparent" and its corollary, courts have not
attempted to explain how to recognize when a suspected terato-
Warning Labels Work?, NEWSWEEK, Jul. 18, 1988, at 40.
193. Id. at 41.
194. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969) ("the
duty to warn depends on when the risk becomes apparent"); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories,
Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968) ("When, after further experience, the danger be-
comes apparent a duty to warn attached.").
195. See supra note 165-66 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 385-86, 549 P.2d 1099, 1108-
09 (1976) (court held that a manufacturer cannot disregard reports of complications coin-
cidental with the taking of its contraceptives and under a strict liability theory, and must
warn of dangers and risks even if a causal relationship has not been definitely established
at the time of the warning); Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 224 Pa. Super. 418,
434 307 A.2d 449, 459 (1973) (manufacturer may not escape liability by ignoring existing
information about side effects from use of chloroquine nor may it fail to do research to
obtain such information).
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genic effect becomes "apparent." The word itself suggests a high
degree of proof. Dictionary definitions of the word include, "read-
ily understood ...; evident; obvious,' x97 and "capable of being
easily perceived or understood; plain or clear."' 9
In Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 99 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a drug company had a duty to warn of
the possibility of contracting polio from a vaccine at the time the
plaintiff received the drug. The court noted that the danger of
contracting the disease was not a known or foreseeable risk of tak-
ing the vaccine early in the use of the vaccine, but the court held
that the duty to warn began when the danger became "appar-
ent. ' 20 0 The court then noted that a Surgeon General's report, is-
sued before the plaintiff was given the drug, made the dangers
apparent, imposing a duty to warn. 0'
The standard of apparent danger was adopted by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., with
explicit reliance on Davis.2 The plaintiff in Basko suffered from
progressive blindness that she claimed was caused by chloroquine,
a drug she received from 1953 to 1961 for treatment of a skin
condition. 0 3 The first scientific study that considered the question
of whether chloroquine causes loss of vision was published in
1957, and concluded that the research subjects' eye problems were
not caused by the drug.20 4 Research reported in October of 1959,
however, reached the opposite conclusion. The defendant used the
1959 report as authority for its request to the FDA in the Sum-
mer of 1960 to include specific warnings about eye damage in the
drug packaging materials.20 5 Under these facts, the court refused
to grant summary judgment for the defendant, holding that it was
for the jury to find whether the warning of possible permanent eye
damage, given in 1960, was timely and adequate.20 6
The "apparent" standard may be particularly well-suited to
197. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 66 (2d
College ed. 1966).
198. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 100 (Una-
bridged 2d ed. 1987).
199. 399 F.2d 121, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1968).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 129.
202. 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969) (citing Davis).
203. Id. at 419.
204. Id. at 426.
205. Id. at 422.
206. Id. at 422, 426.
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combat the problem of dubious scientific evidence when the plain-
tiff's case depends upon proof of implied knowledge of the dangers
of a drug. Courts generally seem unwilling to block expert testi-
mony regarding causation except in extreme cases,207 and rever-
sals on appeal are rare.208 Thus, the apparent standard opens an
additional area of expert testimony: whether the causation about
which plaintiffs' experts will testify was sufficiently obvious at the
time the drug was administered or prescribed to be "apparent."
A scientist's own, unpublished investigations can be used to
prove causation. Currently, a single article, unsupported or re-
futed by later research, which states even a tentative conclusion,
might support a jury verdict regarding causality and serve as a '
first hint requiring a warning.20 9 Indeed, even an article conclud-
ing that no danger of side effects exists might be used to argue the
contrary, based on an expert's reclassification of the data
presented. However, where a plaintiff must show that the danger
of a side effect was apparent to experts in the field, the proof de-
pends on the state of the scientific literature on a given date. The
expert would have to identify the publications upon which the con-
clusion that dangers were apparent rests.
To the extent that scientists insert findings of even minimal
value into the scientific literature, a complete lack of articles con-
cluding that a drug has a certain side effect is a very powerful
indictment of a plaintiff's case. When no literature is found,
judges should have little difficulty ruling as a matter of law that
no danger was apparent. While it may be an acceptable practice
for scientists to "reclassify" data from others' research or to reor-
ganize it to arrive at a conclusion different from that of the origi-
nal study,210 and while such testimony might be allowable to show
causation, it cannot prove that a danger was apparent. The court
should presume that, if the danger were truly apparent, the au-
thors of the original study or some later artible in a professional
journal would have so stated. Thus, if the only support in a plain-
tiff's case consists of published articles failing to conclude that
substantial evidence of teratogenicity exists, it may still be possi-
ble to decide liability as a matter of law.
Similarly, if the particular drug has been explored by numer-
207. See supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
208. G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION To THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 393 (1978).
209. See supra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
210. Wachter, supra note 160, at 1407.
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ous reliable investigators and the overwhelming weight of scien-
tific evidence has refuted earlier suspicions, the danger cannot be
apparent and liability should not flow from a failure to warn.
While lawyers may convince a jury of causation by relying upon
"hired gun" experts whose testimony is facially unreliable to the
scientific community, the need to present a triable issue as to
whether the danger was apparent requires that the plaintiffs show
more reputable proof. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rec-
ognized the value of scientific peer review when it noted that "the
examination of a scientific study by a cadre of lawyers is not the
same as its examination by others trained in the field of science or
medicine." 21' The peer review controls of science, essential to the
reliability of scientific testimony, would thus be brought into the
courtroom under the apparent standard, since liability would flow
not only from what experts are willing to say in court, but also
from what they are willing to commit themselves to in writing
before their peers. 12
Even if a plaintiff can point to an article or two that purport
to identify a side effect, under the apparent standard, the court
should not automatically hold that the plaintiff's case is sufficient.
Scientific editors strive to give scientists open access to the jour-
nals that are the mainstay of scientific communication, even if
those individuals hold extreme minority views. An article may be
published because it posits an interesting possibility rather than
because it makes a convincing proof of its thesis.21 s Indeed, if a
scientist goes "gently round the bend" and "expound[s] some in-
coherent irrational theory" he may still be published by editors
committed to open communication in science.2"4 For this reason, a
beneficial rule would be that the danger is not apparent unless
there is at least a respectable scientific minority supporting the
existence of the dangerous side effect.
Courts already decide when a scientific view rises to the level
of a respectable minority. For example, medical malpractice
claims can be taken away from the jury if the defendant doctor
followed a course of action that a "respectable minority" of doc-
tors in the appropriate field would have taken.215 In the context of
211. Perry v. United States, 755 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1985).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 127-45.
213. J. ZIMAN, supra note 128, at 131.
214. Id. at 144.
215. See Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 379-80, 549 P.2d 1099, 1103-04
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litigation against a drug manufacturer, the court in Chambers v.
G. D. Searle & Co.216 held that the opinion of a single expert, the
only dissenting doctor on an FDA panel drafting drug warnings,
was insufficient to let the plaintiff's claim of insufficient warnings
go to the jury.217 The court recognized that the plaintiff might
have prevailed if the issue were whether the dissenter was actually
correct or incorrect. However, the issue was whether or not the
manufacturer exercised ordinary and reasonable care in issuing its
warnings. The court concluded that the manufacturer's use of
warnings approved by the FDA panel, despite the dissenter's view,
was not a breach of the manufacturer's duty of care as a matter
of law.2""
Thus, excluding scientific evidence not supported by a re-
spectable minority of scientists within the relevant discipline is an-
other way that courts can use scientific opinion to prevent cases
from being decided on the basis of generally unacceptable scien-
tific evidence.
C. A Duty to Warn When a Danger is Knowable by Ordinary
Care
The general rule to avoid tort liability for harms resulting
from use of a product is that the manufacturer or seller must
warn of a danger if it knows or should know of the danger
through the exercise of ordinary care.21 9 Ordinary care includes a
reasonable inquiry into the state of the relevant literature.220 Al-
though this standard gives no direction to the trier of fact regard-
ing how much certainty is required before a warning should be
given, it appears to be used frequently in drug product liability
suits. For instance, the standard treatise on jury instructions, Fed-
eral Jury Practice and Instructions, cites the decision in Basko v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., which applied the "apparent" standard.22'
(1976) (respectable minority is more than some); Olson v. Weitz, 37 Wash. 2d 70, 71-72,
221 P.2d 537, 538 (1950) (court found sufficient evidence of respectible minority even
without expert testimony and put the question to the jury).
216. 441 F. Supp. 377, 383-84 (D. Md. 1975), affd, 567 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1977).
217. Id. at 383-84.
218. Id.
219. W. KEETON. D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 685 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988).
220. Id.
221. 3 E. DEVITT, C. BLACKMAR & M. WOLFF, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND IN-
STRUCTIONS, CIVIL § 82.09 (1987) (citing Basko v. Sterling, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d. Cir.
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The court in Basko noted that a defendant drug manufacturer
cannot be expected to warn against unknown dangers from the
outset, but offered no guidance for an instruction regarding how
certain a harm must be for omission of a warning to be tortious."22
Indeed, even a popular handbook on drug litigation, which in-
cludes suggested plaintiffs' and defendants' requests to charge the
jury in a hypothetical oral contraceptive case, provides no discus-
sion of the amount of knowledge necessary to trigger a warning.22 3
Rather, the suggested requests to charge mention only that there
is a duty to warn "based upon what the manufacturer knew, or,
with the exercise of reasonable care should have known. 224
This general tort standard gives the trier of fact the widest
possible latitude in deciding which failures to warn are tortious. If
the trier believes that reasonable care requires the manufacturer
to issue warnings on a mere hint of a possibility of danger, the
plaintiffs can prevail upon evidence that experts in the field would
disregard as unreliable.225 If, however, the trier believes that rea-
sonable care requires the manufacturer to be absolutely certain
that the drug can cause a harm, then plaintiffs cannot prevail un-
less no doubt exists as to a drug's side effects. Thus, the general
tort standard of care gives juries and, hence, drug manufacturers,
no guidance in determining when enough evidence exists to re-
quire a warning. Over-warning or unwillingness to sell beneficial
drugs are the likely results of giving the trier of fact such unre-
strained discretion.2 6
Leaving ambiguous the certainty required to trigger the duty
to warn does not restrain the natural sympathy that the sight of a
damaged youngster will arouse.227 By failing to define a minimum
of certainty beneath which no warning is required, courts give free
reign to sympathy and disguise verdicts based on emotion as de-
terminations of the level of care required. Since courts are reluc-
tant to overturn a jury's determination of what constitutes ordi-
nary care, and since some plausible evidence that a manufacturer
should have known of a danger will almost always exist,22 8 ver-
1969) and numerous other duty to warn circuit court cases).
222. 416 F.2d at 426.
223. DRUG LITIGATION 793-97 (P. RHEINGOLD 3d ed. 1981).
224. Id. at 794.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 168-82.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 186-193.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 146-52.
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dicts based on sympathy may occur, and they will very rarely be
reversible on appeal.2
VI. CONCLUSION
Application of the "apparent" standard, combined with an
understanding of the role of scientific literature in defining what
side effects might be knowable by art expert in the field, would
improve the quality of drug side-effect litigation. The need to
show that the risk of a given side effect was "apparent" can force
plaintiffs to produce evidence that at least a respectable minority
of experts recognized the risk. This element will have to be proved
through support of the relevant scientific literature and not by the
testimony of an irresponsible expert, who might not be willing to
give the same testimony before a group of scientific peers, nor by
the testimony of an outlying expert, whose extreme view is con-
trary to the scientific consensus.
By requiring that the risk be proved apparent, courts would
succeed in bringing the protections of scientific peer review into
the courtroom. Summary judgment motions would protect defend-
ants from the expense of unfounded trials because apparentness
could be determined by a search of the relevant literature. Drug
manufacturers would be assured that they would not be held lia-
ble for failing to issue a warning based on dubious scientific evi-
dence, but manufacturers could still be sued if their warnings
failed to reflect the current state of knowledge. At the same time,
applying the "apparent" standard retains the incentives of the tort
system to prevent manufacturers from ignoring scientifically plau-
sible reports of side effects, thereby protecting the free flow of reli-
229. Courts generally treat a trier of fact's determination of whether a party exer-
cised reasonable care or was negligent as a finding of fact. E.g., McCoy v. Raqcci, 156
Conn. 115, 120, 239 A.2d 689, 692 (1986) ("Conclusions of negligence or freedom from it
are ordinarily conclusions of fact"); Bussey v. Dawson, 224 Ga. 191, 193, 160 S.E.2d 834,
836 (1968) ("the well established rule [is] that questions of negligence . . . are peculiarly
matters for the jury"). A finding of fact is generally upheld if it is not indisputably wrong
and some evidence in the record supports it. E.g., Thomas E. Golden Realty Co. v. Echo
Six, 9 Conn. App. 52, 56, 514 A,2d 390, 392 (1986) (stating that the function of the court
is limited to determining if the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous) (citing
Damora v. Christ-Janer, 184 Conn. 109, 113, 441 A.2d 61, 64 (1981))); Bussey, 224 Ga.
191, 193, 160 S.E.2d 834, 836 (1968) (holding that a court should not take the place of the
jury in questions of fact except in "plain and undisputable cases"); Murphy v. Carron, 536
S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. 1976) (stating that the trial court's decision will be upheld unless
there is no substantial evidence to support it).
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able information vital to informed decisions about the use of ther-
apeutic drugs.
